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Abstract
Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the most fast-growing field in high tech-
nologies nowadays. Therefore, lots of electronic devices include wireless con-
nections with several communication protocols (WiFi, ZigBee, Sigfox, LoRa
and so on). Nevertheless, designers of such components do not take care of
security features most of the time while focusing on communication relia-
bility (speed, throughput and low power consumption). As a consequence,
several wireless IoT devices transmit data in plaintext creating lots of se-
curity breaches for both eavesdropping and data injection attacks. This
work introduces KeyJack, a preliminary proof-of-concept of a solution aim-
ing to eavesdrop wireless devices and hopefully perform injection attacks
afterwards. KeyJack operates on widely-used devices: our keyboards! This
solution is based on low-cost embedded electronics and gives an attacker or a
white hat hacker the possibility to retrieve data from John Doe’s computer.
This work also shows that this approach could be used to any wireless device
using 2.4GHz radio chips like the NRF24L01 from Nordic Semiconductor.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, most of the people have IoT devices at home or even at work:
for instance, it could be included in a fridge, a set-top box or computers.
IoT is a highly-growing field and it will get even bigger in the next decade
(a Verizon report [16] foresees that the IoT market will hit the $1 trillion
limit by 2019). In the same document, it can be seen that the IoT market
targets several applications such as healthcare and home monitoring. Most
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of these connected devices were designed to perform tasks fast and in a cheap
way (in other words, communication links have to be fast and low-power).
Unfortunately, without security, each device is a vector of threats: malevolent
people could use breaches in wireless protocols to steal or inject data using
man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
In this context, this work focuses on wireless keyboards that are widely-
spread components. This work presents KeyJack that is a kind of wireless
keylogger implemented in a tiny electronic board aiming to retrieve data from
a remote computer. Furthermore, this work gives some clues about using it
as a malicious injection device.
Section 2 presents some related works of both classic keyloggers and em-
bedded electronics solutions with similar goals. Section 3 presents KeyJack,
its requirements and implementation details. Then, Section 4 presents an
eavesdropping scenario where Keyjack is used and gives some hints about
the feasability of injection attacks using such hardware components. Finally,
Section 5 presents some conclusions and perspectives about this work.
2 Related works
2.1 Keyloggers
When an hacker wants to retrieve data from a user keyboard, keyloggers
could be used [13, 14, 9, 4]: these components are usually softwares running
in the background of the target computer. In more recent works such as
Damopoulos et al. [3], keyloggers are also implemented for touchscreen that
are widely-spread interfaces on our smartphones and tablets. Such keylog-
gers aim to keep a copy of each keyboard hit made by the victim. On the
other side, several works such as [7, 12] present countermeasures in order to
implement systems resilient to such attacks. Therefore, IoT designers could
imagine to create embedded systems immune to standard keylogger imple-
mentations.
However, most of software keyloggers are not so easy to use:
• Advanced features are rarely included in free versions. As keyloggers
may be used for ”bad” purposes, developers keep the most intrusive
options for paid licenses.
• Basic keyloggers are not 100% discrete as they appear in the task man-
ager.
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• For some of them, administrator rights may be required by the oper-
ating system (for instance, installing a driver).
• Furthermore, results take up space on the target computer and may
increase its power consumption.
2.2 Other interesting works
In the context of pure keyloggers, there are other interesting alternatives in
the hardware community:
• KeyGrabber USB made by KeeLog [15].
• USB Rubber Ducky, a USB tool by Hak5 [6]. This USB key includes a
60MHz programmable microcontroller and a µSD slot. It behaves like
a keyboard: therefore, nearly anything can be performed (from a Rick
Roll hack to keyloggers as well).
Both solutions look like USB flash drives: it can be easily hidden on a com-
puter port. Even if some countermeasures exists (for instance, KeyScrambler[11]
encrypts of all keyboard hits in Firefox), it is not 100% satisfying as it still
needs some physical access to the target. Furthermore, even if such a tool
may be hidden in the task manager, it is assumed that its power consumption
may be revealed with physical measurements.
KeyJack wants to tackle those problems using an alternative breach:
nowadays, most keyboards are wireless and may be affected by eavesdropping
and MITM attacks. The next subsection presents some works using wireless
connection to reveal security breaches.
2.3 Embedded electronics solutions
There are several works aiming to steal information from wireless computer
devices. The most “industrial” solution is MouseJack from Bastille Net-
works1. MouseJack is an exploit used in several wireless (non-Bluetooth)
keyboards that can be used to perform eavesdropping and relay attacks.
However, a laptop is required to run MouseJack in contradiction to KeyJack
which aims to be a discrete and standalone solution [8].
Other people tried to make things smaller. Digital Security (@iotcert)
implemented related eavesdropping methods for Bluetooth devices running
1https://www.mousejack.com/
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on a single-board computer such as Raspberry Pi [1, 2]: Cauquil et al. im-
plemented a Bluetooth sniffer on a RaspberryPi Zero single-board computer
that can be used to track people and steal secrets (as it was shown in their
Nuit du Hack’16 talk 2).
Samy Kamkar (@samykamkar) developed Keysweeper [10, 5], a solution
based on a small tiny microcontroller similar to Teensy or Arduino Nano.
Even if this solution is the most similar to KeyJack, it does not take into
account the feasability of data injection (Kamkar only focused on data lis-
tening). Furthermore, KeyJack plans to use a GSM chip to perform multiple
eavesdropping with target localization in a use case where several KeyJack
devices would be implemented.
3 KeyJack
3.1 Threat model
There are several keyboard manufacturers. This work focuses on the two
main ones: Microsoft and Logitech (it is assumed that generic/low-cost key-
boards may work as well). Microsoft/Logitech keyboards uses a classic Wifi-
based protocol working at 2.4GHz (for European versions at least). When
this 2.4GHz link is left unencrypted, a classic MITM scheme could be used
as shown in Figure 1.
Data transmission
MITM
Data 
stolen !
Unencrypted link
Data 
injected !
Figure 1: MITM scheme with KeyJack as the eavesdropper/injection device
2http://virtualabs.fr/ndh16/ndh16-mass-pwning-bug.pdf
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For some recent keyboards, the communication between Alice and Bob is
encrypted: even if such schemes may be broken using brute force or other
advanced techniques, this work assumes that the link is left in plaintext:
• For basic models, security was not implemented in the wireless protocol.
• For future perspectives, KeyJack could be adapted to other plaintext
protocols working at different frequencies (5GHz band, for instance).
3.2 Requirements
A KeyJack device must have the following requirements:
• No physical access to the target device/computer. It means there will
not be any USB connection or malicious software installed.
• Tiny implementation: in other words, KeyJack must be a small-sized
board, easily transportable and autonomous in terms of energy.
• “Tracking-friendly”: KeyJack end-users must be able to get eavesdrop-
ping results from a remote device (website, smartphone. . . ).
• Injection-enabled: this work aims to propose a solution which enable
not only eavesdropping but also data injection (from a remote interface
as well).
• This work focuses on a Microsoft Wireless Keyboard 8003. Mainly
because its protocol was unecrypted.
• For further implementations, a GSM chip in order to retrieve locations
of KeyJack nodes in case we want to install a network of such devices.
• And, of course, something that is low-cost and easily reproductible!
3https://www.microsoft.com/accessories/en-gb/products/keyboards/
wireless-keyboard-800/2vj-00006
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3.3 Hardware implementation
KeyJack components are shown in Figure 2:
Figure 2: Electronic components used in KeyJack
From the left to the right side:
• A 2.4GHz board based on a NRF24L01 chip from Nordic Semiconduc-
tors.
• An antenna.
• Adafruit Feather FONA as the microcontroller board: this board in-
cludes, in a tiny form factor, an ATmega32u4 running at 8MHz and a
GSM chip.
• And a battery.
• (the USB cable is just here for programming purposes)
3.4 Software layer
Figure 3 shows an example of a KeyJack network. Each node is the Adafruit
platform described in the previous section running a given Arduino code.
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When each node collects information, it is transmitted to the self-hosted
server where an internal website was developed.
KeyJack node
KeyJack node
KeyJack node
KeyJack server
(self-hosted)
Figure 3: Example of a KeyJack network with three nodes and a server
On the server side, KeyJack interface looks as follows:
Figure 4: KeyJack server interface
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4 Case study: eavesdropping a Microsoft key-
board
As it was said in Section 3, this case study is focused on a Microsoft Wireless
Keyboard 800. Furthermore, we only used a single KeyJack node as shown
in Figure 2. When the user enters the KeyJack server, an interface as shown
in Figure 6 appears. Each keyboard is identified by its MAC address and
has a dedicated menu:
• Search. In this part, the user can read logs of former measurements.
• Capture. Reading captures filtered by their date.
• Injection. Transmitting keyboard keys.
• Hacking. This last tab allows to launch attack scripts.
Figure 5: KeyJack keyboard interface
Normally, the NRF24L01 chip is not able to work as a sniffer: in fact, the
target MAC address is needed and it is not possible to scan the frequency
spectrum around 2.4GHz to find one. However, as Samy Kamkar explained
in its Keysweeper project, we can send fake information about the MAC
address in order to swindle the wireless chip.
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Figure 6: KeyJack injection interface
Figure 7: NRF24L01 packet structure
With previous works of Travis Goodspeed, Samy Kamkar discovered that
if we enter an incorrect value regarding the MAC address size (writing the
preamble itself), the upset NRF24L01 chip considers all preambles as the tar-
get MAC address. However, all data after the MAC address should be the
payload. Therfore, we get all traffic packets with the MAC address and every-
thing else up to the CRC. From there, we can proceed to keyboard detection.
Each brand has its own protocol to deal with the USB dongle on the
computer. Microsoft does not encrypt data sent by its keyboards (it is only
done since 2015 !). The only security measure is a XOR performed on the
payload with the MAC address. As we know how to get MAC address, this
is not a problem for us. As a consequence, we only have to detect Microsoft
protocols and perform a XOR.
Samy Kamkar also discovered that all Microsoft keyboards used a MAC
address beginning with 0xCD (this is the only byte we need in further mea-
surements). In fact, Microsoft is done in a way that the key value is in the
10th position. As the MAC address is 5 bytes wide and 4 first bytes are not
encrypted, the key value is always XORed with 0xCD.
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Figure 8: Packet structure
The last criteria we use to detect Microsoft keyboards is the value of the
first unencrypted bytes. As it is shown in Figure 8, the device type is always
0x0A (for keyboards). Then, the packet type indicates the key category (we
only focus on keystrokes or idles). Related codes are 0x78 and 0x38. We are
finally ready to scan, for all frequencies from 2403MHz to 2480MHz:
• We check if the MAC address of the transmitter begins by 0xCD.
• We test if the paylod begins by 0xA78 or 0xA38.
5 Conclusion and perspectives
This work presented KeyJack, a low-cost solution for basic eavesdropping of
a specific Microsoft wireless keyboard. The proof-of-concept is a standalone
device which can be left in any open-space and small enough to be hidden
from people sight. Even if this study focuses on a specific keyboard model,
there are opportunities with other models/vendors when communications
are not encrypted. Furthermore, KeyJack can be easily modified for data
injection as the server side is already implemented. As each keyboard is
clearly identified, the next perspective is to make a network of KeyJack node
and a single server where we could monitor everything from a remote location.
Finally, KeyJack may be adapted for other protocol where security matters
in the context of Internet of Things.
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